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A b s t r a c t Patients who are asymptomatic carriers of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
are major reservoirs for transmission of MRSA to other patients. Medical personnel are usually not aware when
these high-risk patients are hospitalized. We developed and tested an enterprise-wide electronic surveillance
system to identify patients at high risk for MRSA carriage at hospital admission and during hospitalization.
During a two-month study, nasal swabs from 153 high-risk patients were tested for MRSA carriage using
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) of which 31 (20.3%) were positive compared to 12 of 293 (4.1%, p  0.001) low-
risk patients. The mean interval from admission to availability of PCR test results was 19.2 hours. Computer alerts
for patients at high-risk of MRSA carriage were found to be reliable, timely and offer the potential to replace
testing all patients. Previous MRSA colonization was the best predictor but other risk factors were needed to
increase the sensitivity of the algorithm. J Am Med Inform Assoc. 2008;15:506–512. DOI 10.1197/jamia.M2721.Introduction
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) has be-
come a major public health problem worldwide.1–3 Within
U.S. hospitals, nearly 60% of nosocomial Staphylococcus
aureus infections acquired in intensive care units are methi-
cillin resistant.4 Staphylococcus aureus, whether methicillin-
resistant or methicillin-susceptible, exhibits a propensity to
asymptomatically colonize human hosts. Common anatomic
locations of asymptomatic MRSA carriage include the nares,
groin, and sites where skin integrity has been breached, such
as wounds. Health care workers may carry MRSA on their
hands or clothes following contact either with asymptomatic
carriers or patients who have clinical infection. Health
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other patients. Contaminated environmental surfaces also
contribute to MRSA transmission. Thus, symptomatic pa-
tients constitute a small portion of the actual reservoir of
MRSA within hospitals resulting in an iceberg phenome-
non.5 Reducing patient-to-patient MRSA spread is currently
considered the cornerstone for prevention of healthcare-
acquired MRSA infection.
Background
The infection control community is divided on the most
appropriate strategy to control MRSA transmission among
hospitalized patients.6–8 MRSA carriers are typically not
recognized unless surveillance cultures of sites of coloniza-
tion are performed. In 2003, a Society for Healthcare Epide-
miology Association (SHEA) taskforce advocated a strategy
of using active surveillance cultures to identify patients who
carried MRSA or vancomycin resistant enterococci (VRE).9 It
was also recommended that all asymptomatic carriers be
placed on contact isolation comprised of the use of private
rooms as well as gowns and gloves for all patient contact.
However, this strategy incurs substantial financial and phys-
ical resource costs for the hospital. Another limitation is the
concern that contact precautions may decrease provider-
patient interaction and result in increased rates of other
adverse events.10,11 Simple factors that predict MRSA car-
riage at the time of hospital admission have been identi-
fied.12,13 Thus, the use of a prediction rule to detect patients
at high risk of MRSA carriage offers a more targeted
surveillance strategy.
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organisms across the healthcare continuum need to be
developed, evaluated, and disseminated. Core requirements
for implementation of effective and efficient infection con-
trol strategies include timely, bidirectional transfer of rele-
vant information between infection control personnel and
diverse types of clinical personnel. Relevant information
includes patient risk data and actionable recommendations
to support a standardized infection control process. In the
case of MRSA, healthcare personnel may be unaware of
patients who have had previous MRSA infection at their
hospital or another facility. Advances in the use of electronic
health records, knowledge bases, and inference engines
enable the implementation of such strategies. Moreover, the
value of using computerized decision support to help infec-
tion control practitioners track encounters by these high-risk
patients over a large geographical area has not been studied.
LDS Hospital, the facility where the MRSA alerting system
was implemented, is operated by Intermountain Healthcare,
an integrated delivery system located in Utah and Southern
Idaho. Intermountain Healthcare comprises 21 hospitals, 25
health centers, 92 affiliated outpatient clinics, five dialysis
centers, and a home health care service. LDS Hospital has
been using an electronic health record (EHR) known as the
HELP System for more than 30 years.14 Intermountain
Healthcare has been developing an enterprise-wide EHR
(HELP2) system for more than ten years.15 Together the
HELP and HELP2 systems provided the electronic infra-
structure for determining patient risk. A central feature of
the infrastructure is a unique medical number assigned to all
patients seen at any Intermountain Healthcare facility dur-
ing the first encounter and used for unique patient identifi-
cation in subsequent encounters within the system. Each
night all data from the HELP and HELP2 Systems are stored
into an enterprise data warehouse (EDW).
Prior Use of Alerts
Electronic notification of infection control practitioners
(ICPs) whenever MRSA was identified on new microbiology
test results has been used at LDS Hospital since 1984.16 This
notification program has been disseminated to the other
Intermountain Healthcare hospitals, however it does not
notify ICPs when previously identified MRSA patients were
readmitted to either the same or a different Intermountain
Healthcare facility. A few studies report automated notifi-
cation of infection control personnel when readmission after
discharge from the same hospital occurs, by using stored
microbiology results acquired through automated or man-
ual data entry.17–19 However, none of these systems use
microbiology results from other hospitals or outpatient
settings to identify patients with previous positive MRSA
results and bedside caregivers are not always notified upon
hospital admission.
In an earlier study, we found that patients with previous
MRSA from just LDS Hospital had subsequent encounters at
62 different Intermountain Healthcare facilities up to 304
miles away from 1 day to more than 5 years later.20 More
recently, we expanded the MRSA alerting system at LDS
Hospital to notify infection control practitioners when pa-
tients with MRSA previously detected at any Intermountain
Healthcare facility were admitted. Having an enterprise-wide system for driving infection control alerts provided the
basis for the new program described in this paper. The
current study was also facilitated by our recent work to
implement alerts for critical ventilator events. The ventilator
alerting system demonstrated the value of real time commu-
nication of the event type and room location on flashing
computer terminal screens.21
Design Objectives
Our objective for this project was to test a computer-based
alerting system developed to facilitate rapid, targeted sur-
veillance of adult inpatients for MRSA carriage at admission
and during hospitalization. We automated an MRSA risk
stratification algorithm and computer-based alerting system
to notify nurses and infection control practitioners when
high-risk patients needed to be tested for MRSA carriage.
The alert served as a standing order to obtain a nasal swab
for rapid polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing to docu-
ment MRSA carriage status. Specific goals were to validate
the MRSA risk stratification algorithm and evaluate the alert
system usability. PCR was selected over microbiology cul-




We developed a system (Figure 1) to evaluate risk of MRSA
carriage and alert bedside nurses and infection control
personnel when high-risk patients were identified. We de-
veloped four similar PLSQL programs to search the EDW
and extract all MRSA positive microbiology culture results,
patient registration information at all facilities during the
previous six months, antibiotics (cephalosporins, fluoro-
quinolones, carbapenems) ordered or administered during
the previous six months, and current dialysis diagnosis. The
data were stored on our network in a new MRSA High Risk
database. The primary key for all the MRSA High Risk tables
was the unique medical number used for patient identifica-
tion across the system. An automated (time driven) process
was used to update the data in the MRSA High Risk tables
each night and retain only the most current data.
Identification of High-risk Patients
The criteria used to identify high-risk patients were adapted
from a large-scale validation study22 (Table 1). Evaluation of
the database to determine risk of MRSA carriage was
triggered by either a data- or time-driven process. The HELP
system data-driver was set up to activate a medical logic
module each time hospital personnel entered admission or
transfer (room change) data. The medical logic module
verified the room change data and used a “SQL Write”
routine to add a row to the “room change” table in the
database (unique medical number, room number, admitting
facility code, hospital account number, admission/room
change date, name, age). Data storage into the room change
table activated another PLSQL program to evaluate the risk
criteria. Another time-driven program was triggered at 17:30
each day and calculated the length of stay for all current
hospital patients and used the high-risk criteria to identify
any new high-risk patients. Thus, a risk evaluation occurred
for all patients at admission, transfer within the hospital, or
extended (10 and 30 day) lengths of stay. Low risk patients
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table and not identified as high-risk.
High-risk Alert Deployment
When a high-risk patient was identified, the criteria were
stored into a “High Risk Alert” log along with patient
identification data, hospital room number and a dichoto-
mous “alert sent” field, which was initially set to 0. Every 5
minutes, the Java runtime environment activated a Java
program to check the High Risk Alert table for rows where
the “alert sent” field was 0. When found, the program used
the hospital room number stored in the table to access
another table with designated alert recipient data (i.e.,
hospital division, designated computer terminal IP ad-
dresses, email addresses, and pager numbers).
Table 1 y Criteria Used by Computer Logic to
Identify Patients at High Risk of MRSA Carriage at
Admission or During Hospitalization
a. Previous positive culture with MRSA from any Intermountain
Healthcare
Inpatient or outpatient facility within previous 5 years
b. Current hospital length of stay  30 days
c. Patient on hemodialysis
d. Two or more of the following:
1. Age  75
2. Acute care hospitalization within previous 6 months
3. Inpatient or outpatient antibiotic (fluoroquinolones,
cephalosporins, carbapenems) use within previous 6 months
4. Current hospital length of stay  10 daysAnother Java program designed to “listen” for incoming
alerts, was loaded onto all computer terminals designated
for alert display. When alerts were received, the “listening”
program took control of the computer screen, flashing
alternately between a green and black background. The alert
content (Figure 2) included the message, “MRSA Alert”, the
F i g u r e 1. System description
for the generation and acknowl-
edgement of alerts for patients at
high risk of having MRSA carriage.
EHR  electronic health record;
EDW  enterprise data warehouse;
MRSAmethicillin-resistant Staph-
ylococcus aureus.
F i g u r e 2. Example of an alert sent to the designated
computers on the division of a patient identified at high-risk
for MRSA carriage at hospital admission or during hospital-
ization. Alert contains the room number and the patient
encounter number. Nurses acknowledged the alert by click-
ing on the “close” button in the upper right corner of the
screen.
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content sent to ICPs and study personnel via e-mail and
pagers also included the high-risk criteria and patient name.
Clinical end-users stopped the flashing screen by clicking on
the “close” button in the upper right corner of the alert
window and typing their name in a free-text popup win-
dow. The “listening” program then sent a message to the
alert server to stop other flashing screens and send a
follow-up message to ICPs and study personnel that the
alert screen was acknowledged.
Electronic Logic Validation
The alerting system was tested for 3 months prior to
implementation to identify programming errors, network
problems or obvious logistical issues. Specific validation
outcomes included electronic data capture, rapid high-risk
alert deployment, and accurate risk classification. After the
MRSA high-risk logic was validated by the programmers,
the study coordinator (CJW) made a secondary validation
using the electronic medical records of 33 random low risk
patients. None of the 33 patients were erroneously identified
as low risk. However, 2 (6%) patients had a prior hospital-
ization or prior antibiotic use outside of the Intermountain
Healthcare system documented in a narrative report that
was not used by the computer logic.
System Training
Prior to implementation, study personnel met with the
infection control department, hospital executive and man-
agement leaders, nursing staff on the participating units,
and laboratory staff. Nursing staff recommended: 1) the
location of computer terminals for alert display at each of
the nursing stations; 2) the use of telephone reminders if the
nasal swab was not received in the laboratory within 2 hours
after alert generation; 3) standard nasal swab collection kits
would be placed at each nursing station. The decision to
place PCR positive patients on contact isolation was made
by the ICPs and based on their assessment of the individual
patient. Nurses were shown how to acknowledge the termi-
nal alerts and received additional training on the nasal swab
collection protocol.
Evaluation Design
During February and March 2007, MRSA high-risk alerts
were generated for patients admitted to or located on three
of the five ICUs at LDS Hospital and the nursing unit
clinically associated with those ICUs. The three ICUs were
randomly selected. In response to a high-risk alert, clinical
staff members were instructed to acknowledge the alert and
notify nurses to obtain a nasal swab for PCR testing. A
verbal and written explanation of the study rationale was
provided to all patients prior to nasal swab acquisition. Cost
of the laboratory testing was covered by the study and test
results were stored into the patient’s electronic health
record. The study was reviewed and approved as exempt
from the informed consent requirement by the University
of Utah and the LDS Hospital institutional review boards.
A sample of patients admitted to the study units during
February and March 2007 who were identified as low risk
patients was also tested for MRSA carriage in order to
validate the ability of the alerts to effectively stratify patients
on the basis of probability of MRSA carriage. We queried the
MRSA Risk database to identify a subset of low risk patientsadmitted to the study units within the previous 36 hours on
three weekday mornings (Tuesday, Wednesday, and Fri-
day). The low risk patients were approached for study
participation by study coordinators using the same protocol
as the high-risk patients.
PCR testing was attempted for all patients with high risk
alerts during the two-month study period, but only for a
systematic sample of half of the low risk patients. This type
of sampling is known to introduce “verification bias” into
the estimates of sensitivity and specificity, while estimates of
positive predictive value and negative predictive value are
not affected,23 Therefore, we report Begg and Greenes
estimates of sensitivity and specificity, where the estimates
are corrected for verification bias.24 Pepe has shown that the
asymptotic confidence interval for these estimates to be
unreliable for sample sizes used in research studies and so
recommends bootstrapped confidence intervals.23 There-
fore, we report bootstrapped confidence intervals, using the
“bias-corrected and accelerated” method.25
Status Report
During the evaluation period, 31 of 153 (20%) high-risk
patients tested had positive PCR tests compared to 12 of 293
(4.1%) (p 0.001) low risk patients (Table 2). Overall, 20% of
patients were classified as high risk at the time of admission.
Among newly admitted patients, the sensitivity of the high
risk alerts was 55.9% (95% confidence interval: 39.9–73.3%),
specificity 82.4% (79.5–85.0%), positive predictive value
20.3% (14.2–27.5%), and negative predictive value 95.9%
(93.0–97.9%).
The high-risk patients met 209 of the different high-risk
criteria. Some patients had more than one reason to be
identified when the alert was generated. Thus, an alert for an
admitted patient with previous MRSA and previous antibi-
Table 2 y Results of Computerized MRSA High-risk







Total high-risk patients identified 153 31 20*
Criterion for high risk**
Previous MRSA infection or
colonization
28 17 61
Current hospital stay  30 days 11 1 9.1
Patient on hemodialysis 31 2 6.5
Previous antibiotic and previous
admission
49 9 18
Previous antibiotic and age  75 9 2 22
Previous admission and age  75 27 6 22
Previous antibiotic and  10 days
hospitalization
6 2 33
Age  75 and  10 days
hospitalization
16 2 13
Previous admission and  10 days
hospitalization
23 4 17
*P  0.001 for total high-risk patients compared to total low-risk
patients.
**Patients identified at high risk for MRSA carriage could have met
more than one criterion at time of alert.otic use plus a previous hospitalization would meet two
er as h
510 Evans et al., Identification of MRSA Carriagehigh-risk criteria but only generated one alert. The high-risk
criterion with the highest positive predictive value was
previous MRSA colonization or infection (61%, Table 2)
followed by previous antibiotic use plus hospitalized  10
days (33%). Hemodialysis had the lowest positive predictive
value (2 of 31; 6.5%). Both of the hemodialysis patients with
positive PCR tests qualified as high risk on the basis of other
criteria (previous MRSA or previous antibiotic use plus
previous hospitalization). There were 23 patients identified
as high risk based on dialysis alone of which none were
MRSA positive. If dialysis was removed as a risk factor, the
overall positive predictive value would have been 24% and
if dialysis and the two length of stay risk factors were
removed the overall positive predictive value would have
been 29%. However, 4 PCR positive patients were identified
with the length of stay risk factors (1 of 8 30-day only alerts
and 3 of 29 10-day alerts).
The cumulative mean interval from MRSA high-risk identi-
fication to PCR test requisition was 212 minutes and from
PCR test requisition to PCR test result was 15.5 hours (Table
3). Median intervals for individual steps were shorter than
mean intervals because of a few instances of prolonged
delays. For instance, a network server failure caused the
delivery of 7 alerts to be delayed more than 60 minutes and
two alerts were delayed 4 and 6 hours. Once the screen alert
was activated, we found the average time for the nurse to
acknowledge the alert was 26 minutes. We discovered
during the study that on some occasions nurses inadver-
tently hit the “minimize” button in the upper right corner of
the alert screen rather than the close button (Figure 2). This
Table 3 y Duration Times for Each Step in the Alerting
Step Media
Alert generated on computer screens (Minutes) 3 (1–4
Alert acknowledged by nurse (Minutes) 5 (2–2
Nasal specimen collection time (Minutes) 45 (13–
Nasal specimen received in lab (Minutes) 21 (12–
MRSA test result available (Hours) 16.1 (10.
IR  interquartile range, CI  confidence interval.
*Duration of time from when the patient was identified by comput
Table 4 y Description and Resolution Status of 52 Imp
Issue N Desc
Erroneous alert 6 Alerts sent for “test” patie
Erroneous alert 3 Duplicate alert sent after h
from the rehabilitation u
Erroneous alert 4 Hospital personnel entere
sent to wrong unit (U)
Server downtime 8 Server downtime resulting
Alert timing 3 Nursing request to delay a
admission or alerts gene
Alert reminders 4 Automate reminder alerts
Designated terminal location 1 Unnoticed alert due to ina
Acknowledgment design
problem
2 Alerts awaiting acknowled
delay may resolve)
Acknowledgment functionality 7 Include options to decline
simultaneous acknowled
automate signature of th
Unnecessary tests 7 If positive PCR test results
Laboratory 7 Specimen lost or processin
Total 52resulted in the alert being moved to the task bar on the
bottom of the screen and not being closed. The MRSA alert
log stored the time the alert was closed as the acknowledged
time. This problem was fixed by making the “minimize” and
“maximize” buttons function like the close button. If we
found the nasal specimen collection time to be earlier than
the alert acknowledge time, we used the specimen time to
determine the average for the alert acknowledge step.
Each of the 12 low-risk PCR positive patients were manually
checked against the high-risk criteria used for the study and
none were found to be high-risk and missed by the com-
puter logic. Two patients did have a previous admission to
an Intermountain Healthcare hospital but were before the
previous six months. The most common factor found was
that 10 of these 12 patients were admitted through the
emergency department. The history and physical narra-
tive report for one of those patients documented a previ-
ous MRSA pneumonia at a non-Intermountain Healthcare
hospital.
Implementation Issues
A total of 52 implementation issues divided into nine
categories were documented (Table 4). Initially, nasal swab
collection was delayed on three of four participating units
and reminders to staff nurses were required for 56% of alerts
generated during the first 3 weeks of implementation. Prob-
lem solving with nurses on these units revealed a lack of
urgency for the alert acknowledgment and low prioritiza-
tion for nasal swab collection. Additional education and
workflow improvement provided by the study coordinator
Identification of Patients with MRSA Carriage
Mean (95% CI) Cumulative mean* (95% CI)
9 (3–15) 9 (3–15)
26 (17–35) 36 (0.3–116)
192 (0.2–165) 212 (160–264)
37 (26–48) 232 (2–174)
15.5 (4.7–37.9) 19.2 (18.1–20.3)
igh-risk for MRSA carriage.
tation Issues Identified During Study
/Resolution (R)Resolved, (U)Unresolved
d in the EMR (R)
l account number changed when patient was transferred to or
)
g room number when patient was transferred resulting in alert
layed alerts (R)
5 minutes after admission or transfer due to busy workload at
on unit before patient arrival. (R)
PCR tests are not requested within a specified period of time. (U)
te location of terminals designated to display alerts. (R)
overwritten by new alert for different patient (U, 45 minute alert
call previous alerts, limit user acknowledgment rights, prevent
t by different users, include follow-up instructions for alerts,
owledging user, add patient name to acknowledgment screen (U)
ble within 60 days, do not require repeat testing (U)
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decreased the average nasal swab collection time on the
same three units. For the entire study period on all four
units, 72% of the nasal swabs were collected and sent
without reminders, 20% after a reminder call and 8% were
collected and sent by the research staff.
Discussion
This study demonstrated the feasibility of an innovative
approach for targeted MRSA surveillance through the use of
computer decision support and access to system-wide
healthcare data. It validated the MRSA risk evaluation
strategy used in this study and advanced our understanding
of implementation requirements and potential logistical
issues. Moreover, this study provided an alternative method
for the SHEA recommendation to obtain surveillance cul-
tures on all patients on admission. This targeted surveillance
strategy also provides a more complete data set to monitor
colonization pressure and help improve the identification of
hospital acquisition of MRSA. Monitoring colonization pres-
sure has been shown to help reduce MRSA transmission by
emphasizing infection control measures.26 The plans by
Medicare to deny future reimbursement for some hospital-
acquired infections demonstrates the financial as well as
clinical value of documenting the previously unknown
MRSA carriage status of patients. This information will
increase the potential to protect critically ill or immunocom-
promised patients through isolation of identified carriers
and improve empiric antibiotic selection. In addition, this
study lays the groundwork and provides valuable informa-
tion for large-scale intervention studies to reduce the trans-
mission of MRSA. A recent study found that computerized
reminders for contact isolation based on history of infection
with MRSA or VRE improved compliance with infection
control recommendations.27
These data show that no one risk factor could identify all the
patients with MRSA carriage. Thus, if previous MRSA
carriage was the only criterion used, 14 (45%) high-risk
patients would have been missed. However, 23 patients
were identified as high-risk based on hemodialysis alone
and if “hemodialysis” was removed as a risk factor, the
positive predictive value would increase from 20.3% to 24%.
Thus, we plan to remove hemodialysis as a risk factor which
would decrease the cost and increase the effectiveness by
15% overall (23 from 153 total alerts) and reduce false
positive alerts by 19% (23 from 122 false positive alerts). We
also found that the average total time to identify MRSA
carriage was 19.2 hours which should be soon enough to
help reduce potential self infection by MRSA or transmis-
sion to other patients.
While this study found that computer decision support
can help identify patients at high risk for MRSA carriage,
that information alone would not have any direct impact on
the transmission of MRSA. The information provided by the
decision support needs to be applied at the bedside. The
only method proven to help reduce MRSA transmission has
been the use of intensive infection control methods. The use
of contact isolation has been shown to be effective in
controlling the spread of MRSA.28,29 New hospital-acquired
cases and outbreaks were found to decrease when contact
isolation was appropriately used.30 The rate of transmissionof MRSA from patients on contact isolation was found to be
significantly lower than the rate for patients not on isola-
tion.31 The fact that not all patients with previous MRSA
infection or colonization need to be placed in isolation
exemplifies the value of the ICPs to provide a case-by-case
analysis of each patient. However, ICPs are not always at the
hospital. For this reason the MRSA alerts in this study were
also sent to the bedside nurses. Reducing the transmission of
MRSA has to be seen as part of all healthcare workers roles.
The use of reminders and the problem solving process
improved the timeliness of nasal swab collection in response
to alerts. The alert deployment and follow-up process re-
quired both technical and systemic problem resolution. As
listed in Table 4, the clinicians provided feedback concern-
ing a number of implementation issues and acceptance of
the screen alerts. Technical improvements to the alerting
system should include automated reminders when PCR test
requests are delayed and design changes in the deployment
and the timing of the alerts in addition to the acknowledg-
ment process to minimize workflow disruption. Because
nurses are busy when patients first arrive, they requested
that the MRSA high risk alerts be delayed for 45 minutes.
We have been using “flashing screens” to alert for ventilator
disconnections and inappropriately programmed infusion
pumps for 4 years at LDS Hospital. Clinician acceptance of
this alerting method has been high and was requested for
the MRSA alerts rather than the use of pagers or email.
Based on clinician input, the alert timing was a greater
source of annoyance than the flashing screen, however we
did receive feedback that it may be wise to reserve the
flashing screen for immediate clinical emergencies. Clini-
cians do not consider the identification of MRSA high-risk
status to be an immediate emergency and we plan to test
alternate deployment methods in future versions to avoid
the potential for alert fatigue.
Limitations
Although the sample size of this study was limited by the
two-month duration, we demonstrated that high-risk pa-
tients were 5.2 fold more likely to have a positive PCR test
for MRSA than low risk patients. A larger sample size would
enable a more precise evaluation of the contribution of
individual risk factors or identification of new risk factors to
improve the overall predictive value of the system. Also, the
high-risk detection algorithm used in this study is depen-
dant on the amount and timing of patient data in the EHR.
While the misclassification of patients with a high-risk
history is unavoidable if relevant data are missing from the
EHR, the results of the high-risk algorithm used in this study
could not be duplicated with a system based on human
memory and inter-facility communication.
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